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2.1  Introduction 
Consider two families with different reference groups-a  rich one and a 
poor one, let us say. Most likely the family with the rich reference group 
will feel that it needs more income to  make ends meet than the family with 
the poor reference group. Suppose the income earners in both families 
lose their jobs and consequently apply for welfare benefits. Should the 
welfare benefits for the two families differ because they have different 
needs? 
Probably many people will answer no to this question, but in a slightly 
different context they might answer yes.  In the European Community, 
people from different countries require different incomes (in real terms) 
to make ends meet. Part of these differences are due to the different stan- 
dards of living in the various countries. In other words, people from dif- 
ferent countries have different reference groups. If we would choose to ig- 
nore these variations  in need  and set one poverty line for the entire 
European Community, an income maintenance policy based on it would 
probably turn the welfare recipients in the poor member countries into 
sudden “nouveau riche.” 
Next consider two families with different income histories, who both 
apply for welfare benefits. Is the family that used to be rich, and therefore 
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needs more money to make ends meet, entitled to a higher level of benefits 
than the family that has always been poor? 
Again, many people may initially answer no to this question. But unem- 
ployment benefits in a number of Western countries are related to pre- 
vious earnings and decrease over time. At least one explanation for such a 
setup (apart from the insurance component in unemployment compensa- 
tion) is that it gives people time to adjust their needs. 
These two examples suggest that sometimes policymakers acknowledge 
that poverty is a relative concept, in that it is related to the standard of liv- 
ing of one’s society and to one’s previous income. If one takes for granted 
that poverty is at least partly relative, the question naturally arises how  a 
poverty line (or an income maintenance policy built on it) should be re- 
lated to  the standard of living in society and how  account should be taken 
of previous income. 
In this chapter we employ a model that assumes poverty to be entirely 
relative. We present evidence on the empirical validity of the model, which 
explains variations across families and over time of  two subjective meas- 
ures of well-being. One measure is the individual welfare function of in- 
come developed by van Praag (1968, 1971). The second is a measure of 
how much an individual believes he (or she) needs to make ends meet, in- 
troduced by Goedhart et al. (1977). Based on  both subjective measures is a 
definition of a poverty line. Using the model for the explanation of  the 
subjective measures, one can trace out the effects of various forms of in- 
come maintenance policy on individual well-being. Conversely, using the 
model and the corresponding poverty line definitions, one can devise in- 
come maintenance policies that are in some sense optimal. Both avenues 
are pursued in this chapter. 
In section 2.2 we present the subjective measures and the poverty line 
definitions based on them. In section 2.3 we present the model that ex- 
plains the variations of these measures over time as a consequence of vari- 
ations in family size, own-household income, and incomes in one’s refer- 
ence  group.  The  model  is  estimated  on the  basis  of  a  longitudinal 
household survey in the Netherlands. The estimation results are presented 
in section 2.4. Taking the model for granted, we explore in section 2.5 the 
optimality and consequences of  different forms of income maintenance 
policies. Section 2.6 contains some concluding remarks. 
As always, the analysis in the chapter is  subject to various qualifica- 
tions and limitations. Two of  them are worth  mentioning at the start. 
First, although we use words like utilitx well-being, weuare, and satisfac- 
tion  freely and interchangeably,  these words  have the very  restrictive 
meanings implied by the two subjective measures used. Second, the only 
source of well-being considered is cash-after-tax family income. The limi- 
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known (cf., e.g., Moon and Smolensky 1978) and future work should use 
more elaborate concepts. 
2.2  Tbo Poverty Line Definitions 
2.2.1  The Subjective Poverty Line 
ing question (in Dutch; Dfl.  stands for Dutch florin): 
The respondents to the survey used in this paper were asked the follow- 
Which after-tax family income would you, in your circumstances, con- 
sider to be absolutely minimal? That is to say that you would not be 
able to make ends meet with less. 
Absolutely minimal: Dfl.  ~  per  . 
We shall refer to this question as the minimum income question (MIQ). A 
respondent's answer to the MIQ is referred to as his (or her) minimum in- 
come, ymin. This minimum income is a subjective quantity that will prob- 
ably depend on the respondent's  characteristics, like his income, family 
composition,' income in the reference group,*  etc. We write 
(1)  Ymin = ymin  (JX) 3 
where y is the respondent's  income and x is a vector of other characteris- 
tics influencing y,in.  Relation (1) is illustrated in figure 2.1. 
The lines labeled I, 11, and I11 represent three versions of  equation (l), 
corresponding to three different x vectors. Generally, if x changes, the rela- 
tion betweenymin  and y will change, as illustrated. Let us concentrate on one 
particular value of  x, say the value of x that leads to the solid line I. Note 
the special role played by the intersection point, A, of line I and the 45" 
line. At point A,  ymin = y. Let us call that incomeygi,, so that ygin  satisfies 
(2)  YSin  = ymin (ySin,x)- 
Any individual with characteristics vector x whose income y is below 
y&,  is not able to make ends meet; any individual with the same vector of 
characteristics and an income in excess ofyL  is. If y = yL,, income is just 
enough to make ends meet. All this makes yzin a natural candidate for a 
definition of a poverty line for any individual with characteristics vector x 
(cf. van Praag, Goedhart, and Kapteyn 1980). 
1. Income is defined in this paper as after-tax family income. Family and household are 
used as synonyms. When we talk about individuals or respondents these are usually family 
heads. The words he and she are used indiscriminately. 
2. This dependence follows immediately if we view ymin  as an indicator of  a respondent's 
aspiration level. See, e.g., Katona 1960, chap. 3. 38  Arie KapteydSara van de Geer/Huib van de Stadt 
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Fig. 2.1.  The relation between minimum income and actual income for 
different values of x. 
There is an alternative motivation to take yk,, as a definition of a pov- 
erty line. Consider an individual with incomep. His reponse to the MIQ is 
jkn,  representing what he feels to be the minimum amount that will allow 
him to just make ends meet. Now imagine that we takeg -  Jmin  away from 
him. At first he will consider  Jmin  ias  minimal, but after a while he will 
become used to the income level y and, according to equation (l),  he will 
now consider  imin as minimal. If we next take y^ -  imin away from him, he 
will first consider his new income to be minimal, but after a while his mini- 
mum income will be below his actual income. We  can continue to take 
away income from this individual, and hisy,i,  will keep adjusting until we 
have reached y$in.  (Later on we will have more to say about the dynamics 
of  the adjustment of Ymin).  We  may describe this adaptation process by 
saying that the individual makes mistakes about his minimum income be- 
cause his actual income differs from his minimum. Only at y& are no er- 
rors made because the respondent's actual income is equal to his mini- 
mum income. It is this interpretation that originally led Goedhart et al. 
(1977)  to adopt  y2in as their definition of a poverty line. 
Because  yzin depends on  x, we can have as many different poverty lines 
as there are different values of x. Thus we have implicitly defined poverty 
equivalence scales for different values of x. Both Danziger et al. (1984) 
and Colasanto, Kapteyn, and van der Gaag (1984)  have used this ap- 
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ferences in family size, sex of the family head, age of the family head (un- 
der or over sixty-five), and whether or not a household lives on a farm. 
Below, x will be specified to include past income, reference group income, 
and family size. 
It is worth noting that  Ygin depends only on  what people themselves con- 
sider to be minimal. No interpersonal utility comparisons are involved. 
The approach is subjective in the sense that a poverty line is not defined in 
terms of some prespecified commodity bundle that a household should be 
able to afford. It is only the respondent’s own opinion of what is mini- 
mally needed that is the basis for this definition. This puts a heavy burden 
on  the wording of the question and involves the assumption that somehow 
make ends meet has the same meaning to everyone, at least approxi- 
mately. Although this is an important issue that merits more research, it 
will not be pursued in this paper. 
2.2.2  The Leyden Poverty Line 
following so-called income evaluation question (IEQ): 
In the panel survey used in this paper, respondents have been asked the 
What after-tax family income would  very bad  Dfl. - 
you consider, in your circumstances,  bad  Dfl. - 
sufficient, good, and very good?  sufficient  Dfl. - 
good  Dfl. - 
Please enter an amount on each line.  very good  Dfl.  ~ 
Care has been taken that before answering the MIQ and the IEQ, the re- 
spondent has gained a good understanding of the notion of after-tax fam- 
ily income. Actually the respondent has been asked to compute his own 
after-tax family income. 
A hypothetical response has been plotted in figure 2.2.  The verbal labels 
“very good,” “good,” etc. have been associated with the midpoints of six 
equal intervals that partition the [O,l]  interval. Thus the verbal scale “very 
bad, bad, . . . very good” is transformed into a numerical scale 1/12, 
3/12,  . . . ,  11/12.  Given this procedure,  one can fit a smooth function 
through  the six points.  According to a theory advanced by van Praag 
(1968), the points should lie approximately on a lognormal distribution 
function A(.;p,u).  Tests by van Herwaarden and Kapteyn (1981)  indicate a 
good fit for the lognormal function. 
The lognormal function, dubbed the individual welfare  function of in- 
come (WFI) (van Praag 1971), describes a relation between income levels 
(on the horizontal axis) and welfare levels (on the vertical axis). Our use of 
the term welfare levels means no more and no less than the numbers be- 
tween zero and one that have been associated with the verbal labels in the 
IEQ.  Whether  respondents  themselves associate the verbal labels with 
equal intervals on a numerical scale has been investigated by Buyze (1982) 
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Fig. 2.2.  A hypothetical response to the IEQ. 
and Antonides, Kapteyn, and Wansbeek (1980). Their conclusion is that 
the intervals are not exactly equal, but that they are not dramatically dif- 
ferent. For the present paper, both lognormality and the equal interval as- 
sumption are maintained hypotheses. 
The lognormal function is completely determined by its parameters p 
and u. The parameter p is a location parameter; exp(p) is the income level 
evaluated by 0.5. Thus, the larger p  (or exp(p), for that matter) is, the 
more income one needs to attain a certain welfare level. The parameter u 
determines the slope of  someone's WFI. The larger u is, the flatter a WFI 
will be. The parameters p and u  are easily estimated per respondent by fit- 
ting a lognormal function through the scatter of points in figure 2.2 (see, 
e.g., van Herwaarden and Kapteyn 1981, for details). 
Once WFIs are measured per respondent, poverty lines can be derived 
from them on the basis of the following argument: poverty is a situation 
with a low level of welfare. Setting a poverty line amounts to a choice of a 
point on a welfare scale such that everyone with a welfare level below that 
point is called poor and everyone with a higher welfare level is called non- 
poor. Which welfare level should be the dividing line between a state of 
poverty and nonpoverty is a political decision. Suppose that politicians 
decide that a  is the welfare level (measured on a [0,1] scale) defining the 
poverty line (e.g., a = 0.45) and let U(y)  be the WFI of a particular indi- 
vidual, whose WFI parameters are p and u.  Then this individual is poor or 
nonpoor depending on whether or not 
(3)  W)  < a  * 41  Impact of Changes in Income and Family on Measures of Well-Being 
Given the lognormal specification of  V(y), equation (3) is equivalent 
with 
(4)  MY  ;  p,u)  9 
where A(.;  p,u) is the lognormal distribution function with parameters p 
and u. Equation (4) is in turn equivalent with 
(5)  N([lny-p]/u;O,l)  c a, 
where N(.;O,  1) is the standard normal distribution function. 
Define u, by 
(6)  a  = N(u,; 0,1), 
i.e.,  u, is the a quantile of  the normal distribution. Then equation (5)  is 
equivalent with 
(7)  [In y -  p]/u < u, . 
Given p and u, it is easy to  determine which income is required to make an 
individual nonpoor. The poverty line is simply 
(8)  y = exp[p + u-u,] . 
It turns out, however, that both p and u depend on income y and on other 
characteristics x, in a way to be specified in the next section. So this pov- 
erty line becomes dependent on x, just like the subjective poverty line. 
A concluding word on terminology is in order here. In Goedhart et al. 
(1977) where the subjective poverty line was introduced, the definition 
above was only mentioned in passing as “an alternative method.”  Since 
the choice of a has to be a political one, van Praag, Goedhart, and Kap- 
teyn (1980) dubbed this poverty line a “politically determined poverty 
line,” which terminology was also adopted by Colasanto, Kapteyn, and 
van der Gaag (1984). Since, in the end, the adoption of any poverty line in- 
volves political decisions, the term politically determined is unfortunate. 
Van Praag, Spit and Van de Stadt (1982) call this the Leyden poverty line, 
referring to the fact that at the time of writing all four authors of Goed- 
hart et al. (1977) were working in Leyden. Of course, this term does not 
distinguish it from the subjective poverty line, but at least the name is suf- 
ficiently uninformative to avoid confusion with other approaches. Hence 
we adopt this name here. 
A 
2.3  Determinants of  p, u, and ymin 
2.3.1 
The model for the explanation of  p and (I follows straightforwardly 
from a theory of  preference formation put forward by Kapteyn (1977). 
Recent investigations into the theory’s validity are by Kapteyn,  Wans- 
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beek, and Buyze (1980) and van de Stadt, Kapteyn, and van de Geer 
(1  985). 
Specialized to the present context, the theory amounts to the hypothesis 
that an individual’s WFI is nothing other than a perceived income distri- 
bution. That is, an individual evaluates any income level by its ranking in 
the income distribution he perceives. The idea is that in order to evaluate 
incomes, an individual needs a frame of reference. This frame of reference 
is formed by his perceived income distribution. This perceived income dis- 
tribution summarizes the incomes the individual has perceived over his 
lifetime. These incomes may be his own past or present income, or they 
may be past or present incomes in his reference group. The idea of a per- 
ceived income distribution can be somewhat formalized as follows. 
Let there be N individuals in society. Time is measured in years, t = 
-  m , . . . ,  0, where t = 0 represents the present. At each moment of time 
an individual n (n = 1, . . . ,  N)  is assumed to assign nonnegative refer- 
ence weights wnk(t)  to any individual k  in society (k  = 1, . . . ,  N),  C? =  I 
wnk(t)  = 1. The reference weights indicate the importance individual n at- 
taches to the income of individual k at time t. Obviously, quite a few of the 
wnk(t)  will be zero. On the other hand, wnn(t),  i.e., the weight that individ- 
ual n attaches to his own income at time t, may be substantial. The set of 
individuals with wnk(t)  > 0, k # n, will sometimes be referred to as n’s so- 
cial reference group at time t. For notational simplicity, we adopt the con- 
vention (in sections 2.3 and 2.4 only) that arguments equal to zero are sup- 
pressed, e.g., wnk = wnk(0). 
Furthermore, let yk(t)  be the income of individual k at time t. The refer- 
ence weights now allow for the definition of a perceived income distribu- 
tion at time t. Denote this function by Gn(yI  t),  then its definition is 
(9) 
The G,,(ylt)  for any t can be aggregated to onepresentlyperceived income 
distribution, Gn(y).  To that end a nonnegative memory  function a,(t)  is in- 
troduced, which describes individual n’s weighting of perceived income 
over time, 
(10)  a,(t) = 1, n = 1,. . . ,N. 
I= -m 
The idea behind the introduction of a memory function is that events 
that took place a long time ago will have less influence on a person’s pres- 
ent frame of reference than more recent experiences. Hence, in building 
up a person’s presently perceived income distribution out of income distri- 
butions in each time period we weigh each of these income distributions 
with a time-dependent weight a,(t). 
The presently perceived distribution function Gn(y)  can now be defined 
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As indicated above, the preference formation theory claims that this 
perceived income distribution equals the utility function V,,(y)  of the indi- 
vidual. 
The development of the argument so far has been in terms of individual 
incomes, whereas our data refer to family income (cf. the wording of the 
survey questions above). It may be expected that a family with children 
needs more income than a single person to reach the same utility level, so 
it stands to reason to reformulate the preference formation theory in 
terms of income per equivalent adult (or per capita as we will often say). 
Let f&)  be the number of equivalent adults in family k  at time t. The in- 
come per equivalent adult in this family at time t is denoted by 
The reformulation of Vn(y)  in terms of per capita incomes amounts to  a 
transformation of the income scale: y is replaced by 9 = y/fn and epn by 
a./  fn.  Consequently, 
Replacingyk(t)  andy  in equations (9) and (1  1) by$&)  andjl we obtain the 
perceived distribution of per capita incomes en(y). 
The theory of preference formation now states 
On(j)  = G,(jj) ;  n = 1, . . . ,  N;jj  = [O,  m).  (14) 
Equation (14) implies that utility is a completely  relative concept. The util- 
ity of a certain income per equivalent adult is obtained by comparing it 
with the perceived distribution of incomes per equivalent adult. 
As it stands, equation (14) is hardly operational, because en  has not 
been specified. Also for the purpose of policy simulations-the  main goal 
of this chapter-we  have to be more specific, altogether we will have to in- 
troduce quite a few new symbols before the model is in a form suitable for 
estimation and simulation. 
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The equality of the two distribution functions On  and Gn  implies the 
equality of the first log moments: 
pn = In fn  + tiin + En 
0  N 
= lnfn + c  an(t) C  Wnk(f) Injk(t) + En.  (16) 
Also the second log moments of On  and en  have to be equal: 
I=  -w  k=  1 
0  N 
The measurement errors in pn and u,? and errors in the equations are taken 
into account by means of the independently identically distributed distur- 
bance terms fn  and an, with zero means and variances u$and $. 
Although equations (16) and (17) relate observable variables on the left- 
hand side to observable variables on the right-hand side, there are still far 
too many parameters, in particular the reference weights Wnk(t),  that 
would have to be estimated. So we need further simplifications. First we 
assume that Wnn(t) is the same for all individuals and constant over time, 
i.e., all individuals give themselves the same constant weight. We write P2 
= Wnn(t) and 03  = C  Wnk(f)  = 1 -  02. The function lnfk(t) is specified as 
PO + PI  lnfsk(t) wherefsk(t) is the number of members of family k  at time t. 
The memory function an(t) is assumed to be the same for everyone and is 
specified as an(t) = (1 -  a)a-'.  Furthermore, we define 
(18) 
kf  n 
qnk(t)  Wnk(f)/P3, k # 
so  ,k=n, 
(19)  mn(t)  c  qnk(f) lnyk(f) 
k 
PO + PIEn(t) 
where &(t)  is defined implicitly. So, ?if&)  and&(t)  are the log means of 
incomes and family sizes in family n's social reference group at time t. 
All this makes it possible to rewrite equation (16) as 
+ 03  {mn(t) -  L(t)}I + En 
Next we  apply the Koyck transformation and use  the expression for 
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/.tn  = [  1 -  041 -  a)]/31  lnfs, -  a/%  In&( -  1) +  Pz(l -  a)ln yn 
03(1 -  @)?ri,  -  &(I -  a)fll%n  4-  Upn( -  1)  + €n -  U€n( -  1).  (22) 
Going through a similar derivation regarding equation (17) we can de- 
rive an expression for a,’ analogous to equation (12). This more compli- 
cated expression is given in Appendix A. 
Some details of the maximum likelihood estimation of equation (22) are 
given in Appendix B.3 Here we mention one aspect that will play a role in 
the simulations. In equation (22) there are still various quantities that in- 
volve the unknown reference weights. Consider, for example, m,, defined 
by equation (19). We have constructed a proxy for FR,,  as follows. The sam- 
ple is partitioned into groups of individuals who share certain characteris- 
tics, i.e., within a group individuals have the same education level, are of 
about the same age, and have a similar employment status (see the next 
section for the exact definition of the characteristics). We call such groups 
social groups. Let the unweighted mean log-income in the social group to 
which individual n belongs be equal to y,% Then we assume that we can 
write 
(23)  mn  = K’r] -k  (1 -  K)Yt -k  Un, 
where r] is mean log-income in society, un  is an error term independent of 
y?, and K  an unknown parameter that is to be estimated along with the 
other parameters in the model. 
The parameter K measures what share of the reference group of individ- 
ual n lies within his social group. If  K  = 0, the social group comprises the 
reference group; if  K  = 1, the social group is irrelevant for the determina- 
tion of the reference group of the individual. In van de Stadt, Kapteyn, 
and van de Geer (1985) explicit assumptions are made that justify the ap- 
proximation equation (23). For %,,,  which also involves qnk, an approxi- 
mation similar to equation (23) has been employed. 
2.3.2  Determinants of ymin 
A theory does not exist from which a model for the explanation of ymin  is 
readily derived. One tempting approach is to assume thatymin corresponds 
to a point on the welfare scale, i.e., any respondent associates “making 
ends meet” with, say, a utility level  Analogous to equation (8) we 
would find for the minimum income of individual n,  ymin,,,: 
(24)  In Ymin,n  = pn  + an*Z, 
where z satisfies Zi  = N@;  0,l). Equation (22) could be combined with 
equation (24), and we could estimate the two equations jointly. Because 
3. Available from the authors on request. 
4. This would make the subjective poverty line and the Leyden poverty line equivalent, 
except for the fact that in the subjective approach the welfare level associated with the pov- 
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equation (24) would add further nonlinearities to an already complicated 
model we prefer the simpler assumption, 
(25)  lnYmin,n = pn  -  YO  9 
with yo  an unknown constant to be estimated; equation (25) implies that 
Ymjn,n is a constant fraction of exp(pn).  This immediately  allows us to  derive 
for In Ymin,n  a relation like that in equation (22), with pn and pn( -  1) re- 
placed by lnymin.n  and 1nymin,,,(  -  1) respectively. We will estimate this equa- 
tion jointly with equation (22), but we also test equation (25) by testing 
whether the parameters in theymi, equation have the same value as in the p 
equation. 
2.4  Data and Estimation Results 
The data consist of the first three waves of a panel of 616 households in 
the Netherlands (drawn randomly from the Dutch population). The main 
breadwinner of each household was interviewed in March 1980, and the 
same person was reinterviewed in March of  1981 and 1982. The items in 
the questionnaire included the IEQ, the MIQ, after-tax family income, 
family composition, and a number of demographic and socioeconomic 
characteristics. Three of the characteristics were used to construct the so- 
cial groups mentioned in the previous section: education, employment sta- 
tus, age. Five education levels are distinguished, three states of employ- 
ment (self-employed, employee, not employed), and five age brackets (less 
than 30,30-39,40-49,50-65,  over 65). This leads to a maximum of 5 - 3 - 5 
= 75 social groups, 51 of which are represented in the sample. 
On the basis of this information, equation (22) and the Ymin equation 
analogous to equation (22) have been estimated by means of the LISREL 
program (see Appendix B for details). A test has been carried out of the 
hypothesis that the parameters /31,/3~, a,  K are the same for the ymin  equa- 
tion and equation (22). This equality of parameters implies equation (25). 
The results of the estimations with and without imposition of equality of 
parameters are given in table 2.1. 
The first two columns of table 2.1 contain the parameter estimates for 
the case where equation (22) and the Ymin equation are estimated jointly, 
but without imposition of equality restrictions on the parameters in equa- 
tion (22), on the one hand, and the Ymin equation on the other hand. The 
last column contains parameter estimates under the restriction that a, pl, 
/32,P~,  KI are identical in equation (22) and theymi,  equation. According to 
the xz  statistic the restrictions are not rejected by the data at any reason- 
able level of significance. Hence we will use the numbers in this last col- 
umn for the policy simulations. Moreover, we maintain equation (25). 
Although the meaning of the parameters will probably become clearer 
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Table 2.1  Estimation Results 
Equations (22) 
Equation  and y- 
Parameter  (22)  yfin Equation  Combined 
a  0.36  0.36  0.37 
(0.05)  (0.06)  (0.05) 
PI  0.17  0.21  0.17 
(0.04)  (0.05)  (0.04) 
P2  0.67  0.70  0.67 
(0.10)  (0.12)  (0.10) 
P3  0.33  0.30  0.33 
(0.10)  (0.12)  (0.10) 
K  0.79  0.89  0.81 
(0.15)  (0.18)  (0.15) 
Number of 
Degrees of 
observations  616  616 
freedom  28  32 
X'  33.96  37.89 
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
lightening. The estimate of the memory parameter  a implies that the 
weights given to years 0, -  1, -2, etc., are 0.64, 0.23, 0.08, 0.02, 0.01, 
0.003,  etc. Roughly speaking, the horizon is about five years. 
The estimates of PZ and PS suggest that one's  own past incomes have 
about twice as much influence on one's present needs (as reflected by p 
andy,i,)  than the incomes of others. Referring back to equation (23), the 
estimate of K indicates that the social groups as we define them are rather 
poor proxies of the reference groups of individuals; we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that K  = 1. Although we would have liked to have better prox- 
ies, the standard errors of the other parameter estimates indicate that 
these parameters have been estimated with acceptable reliability. Ideally, 
of course, one would like to have information on the reference group of a 
respondent. Hence, this is one of our priorities for future data-collecting 
activities. 
To conclude our brief discussion of the parameter estimates, consider 
6,. Remember that the number of equivalent adults in a family,f,,  is speci- 
fied as 
(26)  lnfn = Po + PI  lnfsn. 
This means that if the size of a family changes, say, fromfsl tofs2, its cost 
of living increases by a factor cfSz/fsl)S1. The equivalence  scale implied by 
this is given in table 2.2. 
These equivalence scales are very flat. Obviously, specification (26)  is 
rather primitive and perhaps too restrictive, as it implies that the cost of 48  Arie Kapteyn/Sara van de Geer/Huib van de Stadt 
Table 2.2  Estimated Equivalence Scale 


















an additional child is a fixed percentage of family income, for any level of 
family income.  In addition, the definition of  family size in the survey 
questionnaire was  ambiguous because children away from home,  still 
partly supported by their parents, were counted as part of the family. On 
the other hand, it should be mentioned that the cost of children in the 
Netherlands is considerably less than, for instance, the cost of children in 
the  United  States, due to various  government  programs  that  provide 
among other things,  free education and subsidized housing. Results by 
Danziger et al. (1984) and Colasanto, Kapteyn, and van der Gaag (1984) 
for the United States, based on the same subjective measures, show sub- 
stantially steeper equivalence scales. 
As was mentioned before, our model implies that welfare and poverty 
are entirely relative.  In their well-known analyses of Gallup poll data, 
Rainwater  (1974) and Kilpatrick  (1973) come to somewhat contrasting 
conclusions. Rainwater finds that the Gallup measure (“How much does 
it take a family of four in your community to get along?”) is completely 
relative, i.e., it rises in proportion to median family income in society. Kil- 
patrick finds that its elasticity with respect to median family income is less 
than one. The difference between the two authors’ results is partly due to 
differences in method and data. But it is worth noticing that both studies 
are static. The Gallup measure in a given year is related to median family 
income in society in the same year, so no allowance is made for the effect 
of past incomes as in our model. As will be seen in the next section, our 
model predicts that ymin  (which has a rather close relation with the Gallup 
measure) will tend to be a smaller proportion of median family income, 
the faster incomes grow. Thus, Kilpatrick’s result that the income elastic- 
ity of  the poverty line falls to a lower level sometime after the war could 
possibly be explained by a change in the pace of economic growth. 
Finally, it should be noted that in the model we have ignored differences 
in cost of living due to causes other than family size differences. This im- 
plies for instance that people in Mississippi and Wisconsin are  predicted to 
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come distribution, even though the cost of  living may differ substantially 
between both regions. In contrast, people in Ireland would be predicted to 
have very different responses than people in West Germany, even though 
the cost of  living might be similar in both countries. For a homogenous 
country like Holland we did not consider it necessary to account for re- 
gional differences in the cost of  living. Were the same analysis applied to 
the United States, for example, then the model should be extended to in- 
corporate regional cost differences similar to the way the effect of family 
composition has been incorporated. If it were true, however, that people 
in a region only refer to other people within the same region, then our 
completely relativistic model would imply that the regional cost differ- 
ences will come out insignificant. 
2.5  Simulations 
Given the empirical results reported in the previous section, the two 
poverty line definitions in section 2.2, and some additional political as- 
sumptions, one can derive various income maintenance schemes. In this 
section we take both the empirical results and the two poverty line defini- 
tions for granted and explore the effect of  various policy decisions. We 
first consider some long-term (steady-state) implications; then we turn to 
some dynamic aspects of the two poverty line definitions. 
As far as policy decisions are concerned we consider three possibilities: 
1. In the computation of the poverty line, the actual reference group 
and the actual income history are taken into account, i.e., equations (22) 
and (Al),  and the analagous equation forymi,  is used without adaptations. 
2. Politicians do not want to honor differences in reference groups, so 
income  maintenance  schemes  are based  on a  hypothetical  reference 
group, identical for everybody (e.g., the whole society serves as a refer- 
ence group for everyone). 
3. Politicians, in addition, ignore income histories, thus welfare bene- 
fits vary only with family composition. In this case, both the incomes in 
the reference group and an individual’s income history are set at a hypo- 
thetical level. 
We  study the implications of these different policy principles for the 
two poverty line definitions introduced in section 2.2. We also pay atten- 
tion to the role played by the rate of  economic growth (or decline). 
Generally, the analysis will be carried out in per capita terms, i.e.,  in 
terms of family income per equivalent adult. This greatly simplifies the 
algebra and implies that poverty lines always compensate fully for differ- 
ences in family size. When appropriate, we pay some attention to the wel- 
fare effects of  not fully compensating for variations in family composi- 
tion.  We  ignore  the  error  terms  in  the  estimated  equations  and  the 
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2.5.1 
The Subjective Definition 
Poverty Lines in a Steady State 
By hypothesis (not rejected by the data) there holds 
(27)  hymin,n = pn -  70 
where yo  has been estimated to  be equal to 0.12, implying that  Ymin,n equals 
approximately 88 percent of exp(p). Combining equations (22) and (27), 
and indicating per capita variables by a tilde on top, one finds 
1njjmin.n = -yo(l  -  a) + P2(1 -  a)lnJn 
+ P3(1 -  a)%  + a h&iin,n(  -  1).  (28) 
We define an income maintenance scheme based on the subjective defini- 
tion as one where gn(t) = ?min,n(t - 1). An alternative approach would be 
to set Jn(t) equal to  jjmin,n(t). However, in the data, family income  yn  refers 
to the past period, whereas the MIQ (see beginning of section 2.2) asks for 
ymin in the present period. So one is able to  just make ends meet if jjn(t) = 
Jmin,n(t - l), since in that case actual family income and stated minimum 
income refer to the same period and are equal. Whenever Yn(t)  = Jmin,n 
(t - l), we shall so indicate by an asterisk. 
To incorporate the possible effect of economic growth, let us assume 
that median income in the reference group of individual n grows at a con- 
stant rate 6. Setting.%@) = Ymin,n(t - 1) in equation (28), it is easy to show 
that Jmin,n(t) and Jn(t) converge to a steady state in which both grow at the 
same rate 6, provided that 0 < a < 1 and 0 < PZ < 1.  In the steady state 
there holds in each period: 
and 
1nJZin,,,  = In??  + 6 . 
The poverty line is simply a certain fraction of median income in the refer- 
ence group of  individual n.’  If  politicians do not accept that different 
people have different reference groups, but substitute, for instance? (me- 
dian per capita income in society) for #&, then the poverty line is a certain 
fraction of median income in society. In either case differences in family 
size are fully compensated. The distance of ytin to median income depends 
on 03. The more weight one gives to other people, the cloSeryXin.n  will be to 
en  (or ij). To get an  idea of what the number may look  like in practice, let 6 
= 0, and use our estimate for p3 (= 0.33). Then YO/&  = 0.36. The poverty 
5. We call exp(%,J median per capita income in the reference  group. Strictly speaking this 
coincide with the median,  terminology is only correct if the geometric  mean of incomes, 
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line is then exp( -  0.36), 70 percent of median income. In the Netherlands 
the official poverty line is also approximately 70 percent of median in- 
come (again, after tax). 
If there is economic growth, 6 > 0, the poverty line becomes a smaller 
fraction of median income. The faster incomes grow, the greater the rela- 
tive distance between median income and the poverty line can be. (For in- 
stance, if 6 = 0.02, mxis approximately 63 percent of median income; if 6 
= 0.05, mtis about 55 percent of median income.) If incomes go down (6 
< 0), the poverty line tends to be closer to the median; in fact if 6  < -yo 
(1 - a), the poverty line will even exceed the median. For our parameter 
estimates this happens if 6 < -  0.08. In view of the model, this makes per- 
fect sense, because previous incomes codetermine one's minimal needs. If 
incomes fall quickly enough, not even a median income earner will be able 
to make ends meet. 
It is of interest to  contrast this with political practice in the Netherlands, 
where in times of rising incomes the poverty line was moved closer to the 
national median income, and where in the present stagnation the poverty 
line appears to fall slightly faster than median income. 
Politicians might decide that neither 3,,  nor 7  is the appropriate anchor- 
ing point in equation (29). It might be argued that poor people mainly re- 
fer to other people who are poor as well, so  that f%  in equation (29)  should 
be replaced by In jt.  Obviously in that case the poverty line is not defined. 
This is according to expectation, because the model for the explanation of 
Ymin is relativistic, i.e., the reference group incomes serve as an anchoring 
point. If these reference group incomes are themselves dependent on  Ymin, 
a well-defined equilibrium no longer exists. 
The Leyden Poverty Line 
In order not to burden the exposition with too many technicalities, 
most of the mathematics for this section are given in Appendix A. The 
same assumptions are made here as in the "Subjective Definition" sec- 
tion, but in addition it is assumed that the log variance of per capita in- 
comes in the reference group remains constant. As with ymin,  we  assume 
that a measured WFI pertains to the present period, whereas j,,  and Gin 
pertain to the previous period. A Leyden poverty line at time t is then de- 
fined as an income Jn(t) satisifying In J,,(t)  = jin(t -  1)  + u,.&(t -  l), with 
u,chosen by the policymakers (cf. equation (8)). 
The steady-state behavior of the Leyden poverty line is derived in Ap- 
pendix A. We mention the following characteristics of the steady state: 
1. In J,, is monotonically increasing in u,,  as long as 0 <  02  c 1 and 0 < a 
< 1. 
2. There are vertical asymptotes for In J,, at u,  = (bS/pZ)"  and u,  = 
-  (pS/pZ)". In other words, we can let In J,, vary from -w  to +w  and ua 
will vary only from -  (pS/pZ)" to (pS/pZ)".  In view of our estimates of 52  Arie Kapteyn/Sara van de Geer/Huib van de Stadt 
and 63,  this means that u, has to lie in the interval (- 112 a,  112 &), 
which corresponds to a range of welfare levels between 0.24 and 0.76. 
Thus it is impossible to create a steady state in which someone is com- 
pletely satisfied or completely dissatisfied with his income! 
The higher p2 is relative to  b3,  the smaller the range of attainable welfare 
levels will be. The reason for this is that if the habit formation parameter 
p2  is high, an individual adjusts her WFI strongly to own income, so no 
matter how high (or low) her income is, the WFI always catches up with it. 
It is doubtful, of course, whether the model still holds true for extremely 
low values of jn,  simply because below some point, jn  will be insufficient 
to purchase enough food to sustain a biological minimum, which makes 
the notion of a steady state itself illusive. In any case, the results illustrate 
an important phenomenon:  The stronger habit  formation is, the less 
scope there is for socioeconomic policy to influence welfare permanently. 
3. Similar to the subjective poverty line, the Leyden poverty line will be 
closer to the median (of either the reference group or society as a whole if 
politicians replace %n  by$  if economic stagnation, rather than economic 
growth, occurs. 
4. For a! = 0.5, (so u, = 0), the Leyden poverty line is given by 
which is equivalent to equation (29) for yo = 0. 
5.  For 6 = 0 (no economic growth) the Leyden poverty line is 
where dis  the log variance of per capita incomes in the reference group. In 
this case the poverty line is a certain fraction of median reference group 
income, where the fraction is smaller if u, is smaller (assuming  u, < O),?,  is 
larger, and habit formation is stronger. So the poverty line is lower if poli- 
ticians pick a lower welfare level as a cutoff point, or if incomes in society 
(or reference group) are more dispersed, or if people pay less attention to 
the incomes of others. 
2.5.2  Dynamics 
Let us now investigate some dynamic aspects of income maintenance 
policies, maintaining the assumptions made above. The analysis in this 
section is purely numerical. We  consider three representative families. 
The first family comes from a social group with a high median income; the 
second family comes from a social group with median income equal to 
median income in the sample (we take the sample median as a proxy for 
the median in the population); the third family belongs to a social group 
with a low median income. 53  Impact of Changes in Income and Family on Measures of  Well-Being 
For each family eight income paths are considered. The income paths 
correspond to eight different income maintenance policies. These policies 
are characterized by three traits. 
1. The policy is either based on  the Leyden poverty line, based on a wel- 
fare level equal to 0.4, or on the subjective poverty line. 
2. In setting the poverty line, either the actual reference group of a fam- 
ily is taken into account or the family is assigned the whole society as a ref- 
erence group (we call that a hypothetical reference group). 
3. Either the income maintenance policy is only based on steady-state 
values of all variables, or benefits also depend on one’s income history (we 
call the latter case smooth adaptation). 
These three traits define a complete design of eight different income 
maintenance policies. For each policy we  also consider the satisfaction 
with income in each period. All analyses are in per capita terms. Forsome 
selected cases we will also present the effects of not compensating for dif- 
ferences in family size. The rate of economic growth, 6, is set at 0.02. 
The eight different income maintenance policies can be presented by 
means of four sets of diagrams. The first two sets refer to  the Leyden pov- 
erty line and the last two sets refer to the subjective poverty line. For rea- 
sons of space only the first two sets are given here. The labels on the fig- 
ures are self-explanatory. 
In figure 2.3a the income paths of the three families converge to iden- 
tical trajectories. The corresponding utility levels, drawn in figure 2.3b, 
each converge to a constant, but this constant is highest for the family 
with the poorest reference group and lowest for the family with the richest 
reference group. The only family that actually attains the prescribed wel- 
fare level of 0.4 is the middle family, for which actual and hypothetical 
reference groups coincide. 
In figure 2.3~  the income paths do not converge to the same trajectory, 
but now the welfare paths in figure 2.3d do. Apparently we are faced with 
a choice between equity in income terms (figs. 2.3a and 2.3b) or equity in 
welfare terms (figs. 2.3~  and 2.3d), but in the latter case we have to accept 
that different families receive different amounts of  benefits simply be- 
cause they happen to have different reference groups.6 
The families in figures 2.4a and 2.4b are not given time to adjust to  their 
new income situation after they become eligible for benefits. The benefit 
level is set at the steady-state level (with a hypothetical reference group). 
Figure 2.4b shows that the first few years are hard on the previously well- 
to-do family. The poorest of the three families enjoys an increase in in- 
come and welfare by entering the income maintenance program. 
Figures 2.4~  and 2.4d are similar to figures 2.4a and 2.4b. The first-year 
welfare dips of the well-to-do and median family are somewhat mitigated 
6. We have equated equity with equality here, which is not necessarily the best thing to do. Figure 3a 
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Fig. 2.4.  Income paths and corresponding welfare paths for the Leyden poverty line, with prompt adaptation and hypothetical 
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Income paths and corresponding welfare paths for the Leyden poverty line, with prompt adaptation and hypothetical 
reference group, for family size =  1 (left) and family size = 8 (right). 60  Arie KapteydSara van de Geer/Huib van de Stadt 
in this case. After approximately five years the three families enjoy the 
same welfare level. This equality of  welfare levels is achieved by allotting 
different amounts of benefits to  the three families. 
It so happens that, in the steady state, the subjective poverty line corre- 
sponds to a utility level of only slightly less than 0.4, so numerically the 
Leyden poverty line and the subjective poverty line are  close together. As a 
consequence, the time paths for the subjective poverty line in the various 
cases are very similar to those of the Leyden poverty line. For reasons of 
space we do not present these graphs. 
Finally, figures 2.5a and 2.5b give income and utility paths for the same 
cases as considered in figures 2.4a and 2.4b, but now the income'compen- 
sation is based on a family size of three for every family, irrespective of its 
size. In figures 2.5a and 2.5b we see what this means for a family of size 1 , 
whilst figures 2.5~  and 2.5d tell the story for a family of size 8. The draw- 
ings are very much according to expectation. The one-person household 
gets a bonus and the eight-person family will have a hard time making 
ends meet. 
2.6  Concluding Remarks 
Given the model, one can simulate the effects of a variety of income 
maintenance programs on the distribution of  well-being (as measured by 
our two subjective measures) of  program participants.  At the present 
stage, that would seem far too pretentious. The model is based on a rather 
small longitudinal data set for one country, and the specification of family 
composition effects is primitive.  More importantly, the model does not 
have any behavioral relations. 
However, the policy simulations have revealed a number of issues that 
have to be dealt with in the design of income maintenance policies. These 
issues do not depend heavily on the correctness of the model, but they do 
rest on the assumption that poverty is at least partly relative. Let us briefly 
summarize some of the issues. 
Habit formation. The policy principles embodied in the two poverty line 
definitions require families to be able to make ends meet or to attain some 
prescribed minimum welfare level. To be consistent with these principles, 
we may have to pay very high initial compensations to, for instance, a for- 
mer top executive of a firm that went bankrupt (leaving aside the possibil- 
ity that this man can draw from savings accumulated in more prosperous 
times or from some kind of insurance policy). Politically, such high initial 
compensations will probably be considered absurd. Yet  not paying these 
large sums amounts to a policy that is inconsistent in that the basic princi- 
ple is not applied to all citizens. Former top executives of bankrupt firms 
apparently get a very small weight in the social welfare function. 
Reference groups. We have seen various instances where consistent ap- 
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with different reference groups. If you have rich friends you are entitled to 
more support. Politically, this is once again hard to accept. It might mean, 
for example, that blacks would in general receive less income support than 
whites. But not taking reference groups into account means that differ- 
ences in utility persist (cf. figs. 2.3a and 2.3b, 2.4a and 2.4b). If one con- 
ceives of a social welfare function as defined in terms of individual utili- 
ties, this means that people get less weight the richer their reference group 
is. 
Which  poverty line? Our analysis has been based on only two, perhaps 
rather special, definitions of poverty. We believe that other definitions, as 
long as they allow for a relativistic component in poverty, would yield 
similar conclusions. As the Leyden poverty line and the subjective poverty 
line lead to such similar results, not much of a choice exists between the 
two. The main difference between them is that, with the Leyden poverty 
line, a degree of freedom is left for politicians, since they bear the respon- 
sibility of choosing the utility cutoff point a.  Whether politicians will ap- 
preciate having this responsibility remains to be seen. 
Family size. In the policy simulations we have paid little attention to  the 
effect of  family size, because we  took it for granted that most people 
would agree that differences in the cost of  living caused by differences in 
family composition should be compensated for. Still one could argue that 
habit formation, reference groups, and family size all play the same role 
in that each influences parameters of  the utility function. What sets family 
size apart is probably the term cost of living, which lends itself an objec- 
tive nature. For the same reason distinctions according to region or farm/ 
nonfarm are often accepted as a basis for differentiating benefit levels. 
Of course cost of living is a rather arbitrary expression. It refers to the 
income compensation necessary to allow families of different composi- 
tion to attain the same level of well-being. Precisely according to this defi- 
nition, we can say that a person faces a high cost of living because he or 
she has rich friends. 
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Appendix A 
Steady-State Analysis of the Leyden Poverty Line 
Analogous to equation (22) the following expression for a,”can  be derived: 63  Impact of Changes in Income and Family on Measures of Well-Being 
ri = C  qnk(hfsk -  Infsn12, 







1:  = [tn -  En(-  1)12, 
En(-1)  = pn(-1) -  4-1), 
(A9 
(A10) 
& = [lnfs, -  In&( -  1)12, 
Wn = [tn -  En(-  1)1[1nfsn -  lnfh(-  1)l. 
In principle, we can estimate equations (22) and (Al)  jointly, by means 
of maximum likelihood, assuming that en and 6,  are jointly normally dis- 
tributed. Equation (Al) is substantially more difficult to estimate than 
equation (22), because it contains quadratic terms like cn,  dand  I:  that in- 
volve the unobservables En and En( -  1). Since equation (22) contains the 
same parameters as equation (Al), the parameters can also be estimated 
by just using equation (22). This neglect of equation (Al)  may cause loss 
of accuracy of the estimates, but it does not cause inconsistency. For the 
sake of simplicity we have chosen to use only equation (22) in estimation. 
In the simulations, equations (22) and (Al)  are both used. 
Rewrite equations (22) and (Al)  in per capita terms: 
(A1  1) 
(A 12)  i?:=  ~2(1  -  u)G+  -  a)$:+ aC+  ai?$-l). 
Under the assumptions of the section “Leyden Poverty Line,” the steady- 
state solutions for In jn,jin.,  and6,”  have to satisfy the following three equa- 
tions: 
Fn = P2(1 -  a)  lnfn + /%(I -  U)  %n  + a&,( -  I), 64  Arie KapteydSara van de Geer/Huib van de Stadt 
Elimination of  bn  and::  from this system yields the following quadratic 
equation in (In Jn  -  %): 
(A161 
where 
9/33(03 -  pzd)  203x2 4-  (1 -  IdfU2)Zz 
-  d(l33Z + a.6.z)  = 0, 
x 5 (In Jn -  &n)  and z = 6/(1 -  a). 
The solution for In Jn is: 
(A171  n -  mn  lnJ  -= 
P3(P3 -  024 
+ -032  -k  &[p3{(p3a2 -  -k  pZ)z2 -k  (33 -  pZIdf)(p3.?; + a.6.z)}]” 
Note that there are vertical asymptotes at u,  = (P3/p2)M  and u,  = -  (p3/ 
P2)% as claimed in section 2.5.1.  The condition that u, is between those ex- 
treme values guarantees convergence of the system to the steady state. The 
various characteristics of the steady state reported in section 2.5.1 follow 
from equation (A17). 
Comment  Harold W.  Watts 
This chapter develops a theory about how individuals’ subjective evalua- 
tion of their income status depends on social context and accumulated ex- 
perience. The framework the authors present lends itself to two alternate 
approaches to the definition of  poverty thresholds. An empirical section 
provides estimates of  a particular specification of this model, and from 
these estimates illustrative  examples show how income support targets 
would adapt for families with differing starting points in a world of steady 
growth. 
As a part of the growing literature on subjective measures of utility, the 
first part of  this chapter is very interesting and valuable. There are some 
interesting  empirical regularities in the data from subjective questions 
such as the MIQ and IEQ; they must mean something. I am not yet fully 
convinced that  we  have figured out what  question is really being  an- 
swered, but the structure spelled out in this paper is a welcome addition to 
the conjectures. I fully share the notion that normative standards of some 
sort are formed in some way for some set of  social groupings. I see a ma- 
jor challenge in eliciting and understanding their more precise meaning. 
The process postulated by the authors for forming the perceived income 
distribution places familiar strains on the “as if” method of theorizing 
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about complex data-processing problems. The expressions presented in 
the paper are formidable for a person not yet familiar with household 
computers, so the typical individual must simply act “as if” he or she had 
evaluated such expressions. Aside from that, however, where do people 
get quantitative perceptions about money income levels? If television is as 
pervasive as it seems, and if the life-styles observed there can influence in- 
dividual perceptions, then a very important societywide influence should 
be recognized. But I still have trouble understanding how money income 
(adjusted to a per-adult-equivalent basis of course) is estimated by every- 
one for everyone on  the basis of every-day observations. People do  not di- 
rectly advertise their (normalized) income levels and may even try to de- 
ceive. Neither are such levels to be found as part of the documentation 
presented at the end of films and television programs. I would like to see 
more attention given to the problem of data gathering and processing, 
which must provide some plausible counterpart to the elaborate structure 
devised by the authors. 
On a more basic level I have a problem with the identification of the em- 
pirical measures as “utility.” Our training as economists may make utility 
a useful metaphor in this case, but repetition of the term may lead to tak- 
ing the idea too seriously. In fact, we have some empirical regularities in 
search of a concept and, in utility, a concept in search of empirical realiza- 
tion. They have found each other, but I am not sure it is a stable union. 
The authors acknowledge that the proposed utility is partial-it  is based 
only on income status, and at least a few other aspects of one’s life and cir- 
cumstances would have to  be considered in a comprehensive  measure. But 
this partial utility is expressed by a single member of a household, and 
whether that one is a despot, dependent, or something else, some question 
remains about how well that person can represent all family members. A 
parent who enjoys his or her large family may have a very different view 
about income adequacy than the children who were never  canvassed 
about their preferred number of siblings. How, indeed, does one aggre- 
gate this “utility”? Is it assumed that each member of the family enjoys 
the same, undiminished common level of utility indicated by the respon- 
dent, or is the answer a measure of a total that must be shared out among 
all persons (and not just the “equivalent adults”)? 
When the model is specified for purposes of estimation, the double-log 
specification for the adult  equivalent  function was  introduced.  That 
specification was not tested, or at least the tests are not reported, but the 
elasticity seems extreme enough to suggest further examination. The im- 
plied economies of  scale-12  to 15 percent more income provides the 
same utility for twice as many persons-would  seem to have enormous 
policy implications if it could be believed. A campaign to raise real income 
by forming confederations of households would seem irresistable. Other- 
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tent with the convenient approximations involved in ignoring reference 
groups  smaller  than nations  and  assuming that  most  adjustments  to 
changed circumstances take place within a year or so. The strong influ- 
ence of personal experience relative to perceptions of others leaves a need 
for careful modeling of relative income status, but places a definite limit 
on the homogeneity of income utility scales among individual respon- 
dents. The minimum or “ends meet” income appears to be at about 88 
percent of the median of individual perceived income distributions, which 
seems rather high on an intuitive basis, but there may be reasons in the 
particulars of Dutch society or policies that can explain this finding. 
The attempt to apply the utility model to public policy issues is what I 
find least persuasive. This part of the chapter seems naive at least and may 
well be misleading. First, the simulated policy is a simplistic and generally 
discredited form of policy-that  of “filling the gap” by granting whatever 
is the shortfall from some guarantee level stated either in income per adult 
equivalent or in terms of  a prescribed dose of  “utility” as defined in 
the theory. Such a policy is appropriate only if  households are behaviorally 
inert. They must be subject only to exogenous determination of income 
flows, wealth accumulation, and family composition,  making no deci- 
sions on their own that influence these matters.  The authors recognize 
the absence of  any behavioral  response,  but they do not  indicate that 
features sensitive to such responses might largely dominate the choice of 
policies. 
Even if the problem of incentives is ignored, it is doubtful that the ob- 
jectives of public policy are  well captured by seeking to  maximize or equal- 
ize the narrowly  defined  utility  (of  money income only) as  perceived 
through the eyes of one household “spokesperson.”  Indeed it seems quite 
likely that the purpose and justification of policy intervention is based on 
considerations that are not well reflected in the sort of additive and sep- 
arable (by family) social welfare function (or fragment of one) that is re- 
presented here. In particular, the social objective may be more closely re- 
lated  to the external consequences of  the household’s investment and 
production activities than to its self-evaluated consumption. Certainly the 
impact of child-rearing activities on the productivity of future generations 
carries part of the justification for antipoverty transfers. Just how that is- 
sue is reflected in answers to survey questions about the level of a “good” 
income is far from clear. 
We might ask what levels of deprivation or adequacy impair or enhance 
the next generation’s capacity to support itself and the dependents it will 
inherit and produce. This form of the question may also have important 
relative aspects and may even be evoked from responses to survey ques- 
tions. But it is not likely that this notion is the same as the more hedonistic 
assessment suggested by the IEQ and by the utility metaphor presented 
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Again, even if the consumption flow is given high priority in the social 
purpose, the current money income measure is a very weak proxy, and it 
certainly is not uniformly related to consumption among different low-in- 
come (or low-consumption) groups. Hence policies that contemplate giv- 
ing higher public grants to those who have experienced higher consump- 
tion (either directly or vicariously) should consider whether that same 
history of well-being is reflected in wealth, credit, and access to private 
transfers. If so, the paradox of giving more to the formerly rich is not likely 
to occur. 
The things not considered in the specimen policies examined in this pa- 
per will generally outweigh the weak influences of reference group and 
lagged response of perceptions on any realistic policy. In most cases I can 
think of, real policies would probably tilt in the opposite direction. Those 
with rich friends and family connections would get less so as to maintain 
rough equity with those whose family and friends cannot provide access 
to private resources of various kinds. Similarly, a loss of income for a low- 
earning person cannot plausibly be supplemented by drawing on past sav- 
ings or credit lines. Those in low-cost and low-income areas might some- 
times receive higher benefits as an attempt to “catch up” in development 
of that human capital that had suffered from prior deprivation. Effects 
on the incentive to migrate are likely to receive the most intense political 
attention, and some of that is deserved. All of these considerations are 
more important and more directly related to public policy than the issues 
introduced in this paper. There is little danger that well-formed policies 
will give bigger benefits to the formerly rich, even if full allowance is made 
for the influences discussed by the authors. 
In the matter of making utility or happiness a direct focus of policy, I 
am inclined to demur. I remain more comfortable with the notion of hap- 
piness as something to be pursued,  not something that the government 
catches and presumes to dole out. I think public policy has more urgent 
and more feasible tasks. 
So where are we? The  chapter presents an interesting rationale for a fas- 
cinating empirical regularity. The resulting model, when implemented, 
yields plausible or at least interpretable estimates that give a definite but 
limited role to lagged adjustments and to the influence of prevailing gen- 
eral income levels in forming perceptions and income standards. The leap 
to policy prescriptions is very premature and ill considered in my view. 
The issues raised by the model are among the least important for income 
maintenance policies, and considered alone, as they are, lead to appar- 
ently paradoxical  results that probably would not be noted in realistic 
policies.  Whether  the subjective and relative approaches can give real 
guidance to policy in this area remains to be seen, but a much more so- 
phisticated specification of public (and private) objectives is a clear pre- 
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